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ABSTRACT
Sluggish growth in low-income countries, despite the high performance in other
economic indicators, motivates the literature to switch attention to institutions.
Despite its crucial economic implications, there is limited attention on rent-seeking
as a driver of economic growth in low-income countries. This paper investigates the
effect of rent-seeking on growth in low-income countries from 2004 to 2017 using the
system generalized method of moments estimator. The empirical results reveal that
rent-seeking negatively affects growth, implying that it obstructs the pace of economic
development in low-income countries. Hence, it is necessary for policymakers in
these countries to adopt anti-rent-seeking policies to promote a rapid and sustainable
growth.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world’s socioeconomic condition has witnessed significant progress since the
past two decades (World Bank, 2017). Credits have been given to globalization in
the aspects of rapid technological diffusion and greater access to capital and global
markets, which has in turn led to unprecedented rates of economic growth (Wang,
1990). As a result of globalization, resources, know-how, and technologies have
been increasingly diffused at a rapid rate across nations, hence policy solutions to
promote further progress proliferate. While these increasing trends have helped
many nations and mankind to progress, other regions and populations seem to
have been left behind due to violence, slow growth, and limited opportunity for
improvement (Gwartney et al., 2006). This is because effective policies leading
to positive and sustainable economic growth have not been adopted or are
poorly implemented in these regions (World Bank, 2017). In other words, while
the development policies around the globe have prioritized the policies and
interventions needed for improving outcomes, little attention has been paid to
analyze the reasons why these policies and interventions succeed in some nations
or regions but fail in others.
While countries generally have a set of common development objectives,
namely promoting economic growth and the sustainability of the development
process, their policies do not always produce the same desired outcomes and
contradictions do exist in reality. The common culprit associated with these
contradictions seems to be institutional malfunction including pervasive rentseeking activities, which channel resources from the productive sectors to the
unproductive sectors of these economies (Brooks et al., 1990). Accordingly,
challenges faced especially by developing countries, which include weak delivery
of services, violence, sluggish growth, natural resource curse, and the most
prominent issue—rent-seeking—require reconsidering the process by which state
and non-state agents interact to design and implement policies in such a way that
uphold institutional quality for mitigating rent-seeking activities (Auriol, 2006).
The objective of our study is to examine the effect of rent-seeking activities on
economic growth in low-income economies.
Rent-seeking refers to the abuse of public office for private gain (World Bank,
1997). It involves expenditure by interest groups in the form of lobbying/bribery
to obtain advantageous treatment from the government through public policy like
regulation, taxation, and subsidies (Krueger, 1974). Particularly, the rent-seekers
look for an opportunity to spend money in lobbying governments’ decisions in
order to gain extra ‘rent’ by bending these decisions in their favor. The existence
of rent-seeking activities in an economy is a sign of poor institutional quality
(Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011). This is because they create a distortion to the cost and
incentive structure of an economy, trigger waste and misallocation of resources as
public investment/funds might be channeled to unproductive sectors (See Barro,
1991), and destroy the development potential of the best entrepreneurs (Auriol
et al., 2016). Hence, rent-seeking results in the reduction of economic efficiency
through the misallocation of resources by governments, and ultimately impede
economic growth and development.
In developing economies, where economic growth plays an especially
important role in economic development, issues related to institutional quality
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/5
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seem to be a significant factor of the limited progress in economic development
(Valeriani and Peluso, 2011). Based on the reports of the International Country
Risk Guide and the Transparency International, we observed that the control
of rent-seeking activities is weak, as indicated by low scores of Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) for Low-Income Countries (LICs) when compared to the
group of Middle-Income Countries (MICs) and High-Income Countries (HICs).
We also observed that countries (such as Norway, Denmark, Finland, Netherland,
New Zealand, and Singapore), which have been achieving high Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) per capita are those that have better control of corruption, as
indicated high scores of the CPI, and hence low level of rent-seeking activities. By
contrast, nations (such as Tajikistan, Papua New Guinea, Madagascar, and Sierra
Leone, Cambodia) characterized by low CPI scores(or high rent-seeking activities)
are those with low GDP per capita and hence are LICs. See Table 1 for selected
related literature.1
In these countries, quantitative control or quantitative easing has served as
a by-product of the governments’ attempts to affect the pace of development
through centralised planning (Blomqvist and Mohammad, 1986). A centralized or
authoritative planning process is exposed to limited competition and transparency,
rent-seeking activities, a reduction in productivity and efficiency, and hence
restricts economic growth (Blomqvist and Mohammad, 1986). Generally, the
economic issues that exist in developing countries are often brought about by the
side effects of such control by elites or self-interest groups. On the other hand, the
public sector, alongside civilian and military bureaucracies tend to be organized
naturally for collective action in the urban areas.
Motivated by institutional as well as growth-related issues faced by developing
economies, this study employs the system Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) estimator to investigate the effect of rent-seeking activities on economic
growth in LICs. We focus on LICs because these countries are experiencing an
increasing trend of rent-seeking activities. It is observed that LICs have shown
lack of effort to control rent-seeking activities. Based on the World Bank’s World
Governance Indicators report (i.e. World Governance Indicators, 2017), a majority
of the LICs have experienced a decrease in the CPI score during the period 20102017, indicating that the efforts and the level of control of rent-seeking activities
have been low in these countries. The report also revealed that the LICs’ average
CPI score is 26.59, which is far lower than the those of Middle-Income Countries
(MICs) and High-Income Countries (HICs).
This study is crucial to the existing literature and the policy arena for a couple
of reasons. First of all, it focuses on the institutional quality of the countries as
the key driver of economic growth rather than the conventional drivers such as
labor, human and physical capital accumulation, investment, among others (Juhro
et al., 2020). Good quality institutions provides a country an incentive framework
on transaction costs and the interaction among economic agents, which in turn
influence the country’s overall economic development (see North, 1991).

1

See https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2017/index/nzl
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This table shows some of the related literature on the rent-seeking-growth nexus. By and large, They are categorized based on the nature of the study (theoretical or empirical), objective
of study, and methodology.

Table 1.
Related Literature Review
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Second, this research is also relevant to the literature in the sense that its
empirical results affirm the ‘sand’ or ‘grease’ on wheels hypothesis/puzzle and
hence provide a clear and robust finding as compared to the mixed findings
of prior studies in the literature. Our focus on LICs is unique to the literature
because the existing studies on the rent-seeking–economic growth nexus mainly
analyze the relationship in a wide scope of heterogenous countries (see Huang,
2016). The empirical findings and policy recommendations of these studies would
suffer from the one-size-does-not-fit-for-all issue. Thus, the focus on the LICs by
our is adequate because these countries desperately need high and sustainable
growth to move upward to a higher economic ladder; they are also commonly
deemed to have suffered from weak institutional quality in general (Blomqvist
and Mohammad, 1986; Mishra et al., 2014).
Given the weak institutional and economic situations in LICs, we ask the
following questions: What is the specific political determinant of economic
growth in the LICs? What is the main obstacle impeding economic growth in
these countries? While Comoros, Senegal and Zimbabwe were upgraded to lower
middle-income status, there have been debates regarding why other countries
retained their LICs status (Federal Reserve of St Louis, 2015)2. In order for LICs to
move upward to a higher ladder, understanding the key determinants of economic
growth is essential.
To enhance sustainable economic development in LICs and hence rid them
of the poverty trap, enhancing the quality of institutions appears to be inevitable.
However, to our knowledge, there have been limited research examining the
effects of rent-seeking activities on economic growth in LICs. Instead, the literature
mainly focuses on High-Income Countries (HICs) and on the MICs (see Auriol et
al., 2016). This paper contributes to the literature in this regard by investigating the
effect of rent-seeking behaviour on economic growth in LICs. The empirical finding
of this study provides explanation to policymakers in the LICs as to why their
countries have been persistently facing difficulties in stimulating and sustaining
rapid economic growth despite the extensive efforts made by governments to
attract more FDI, capital accumulation, etc. In other words, the finding provides
policymakers in these countries a clear direction on the key aspect of the economy
to be focused on especially when the conventional macroeconomic policies are
ineffective to boost and to sustain growth and hence to move upward to a higher
economic ladder.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II develops the theoretical
framework. Section III explains the methodology. Section IV describes the data.
Section V reports the empirical results and interprets the findings. Section VI
concludes and provides the policy implication of the paper.
2

Majority of the low-income countries are earning 30 to 50 times lower (and sometimes even less than
$1000 per year in 2014) per capita income compared to high-income country like the United States.
Based on the existing data, it takes around 170 to 200 years to converge to the United States living
standards, by assuming that the growth rate of the United States remains constant at 2 percentage
point per year. On the other hand, for middle-income countries to converge to high-income countries,
they need to achieve growth rate of at least 11 percentage point per year continuously for 40 to 50
years. This implies that it is even more difficult for the low-income countries to catch up with the
high-income countries in term of growth. Hence, the limited pace of income convergence and the
relative income traps (faced by the low-income countries) appear to be real problems.

Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021

5

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 24, No. 2 [2021], Art. 5
210

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 24, Number 2, 2021

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
To examine the effects of rent-seeking activities on economic growth, the basic
theoretical framework of the study is based on the work of Barro (1991) and Mauro
(1995) in which general production function is expressed as:
(1)
where Y represents total output level; T refers to total factor productivity; K and L
refer to capital and labor, respectively. Where t represent the time subscript and i
represent cross section. The total differentiation of Y is given as:
(2)
Dividing Equation (2) by Y yields a decomposition similar to Solow (1956)3:
(3)
Equation (3) can be explained by using Schumpeterian growth theory of
economic development4, whereby it distinguished two components the progress
of an economy. The first relates to the growth component associated with
the growth rate in capital and labor under the changes in factor availability.
The second relates to the development component associated with the forces
driving total productivity growth in the production function under social and
technological changes (Schumpeter, 1961). The said components are characterized
as the following:
(4)
where GRt represents the growth rate of real GDP; γit refers to the total factor
of productivity; IYit denotes the investment-output ratio; and dLLit represents
the growth rate of labor. The marginal productivity of capital is shown by FIY;
the output elasticity of labor is FdLL; and Fγ is assumed to be equal to 1,where t
represent the time subscript and i represent cross section.
To examine economic growth based on the general productivity function of
Barro (1991), few variables will be included into the model: factors of production
like capital formation, labor force, population, and others. Essentially, to capture
rent-seeking activities, CPI is used as the proxy for these activities. Thus, our
growth model can be illustrated by the following function:

3

4

This equation is used to examine the difference in growth performance across countries and differs
from the traditional growth studies.
The Schumpeterian growth theory attempts to explain the gap between growth and economic
development across countries. Besides, it analyses institutional development in a simple framework
to capture the concept of growth-enhancing policies or how institutions may change based on the
country’s level of technology development
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in which the growth components include labor force, capital, and population,
other than rent-seeking. To ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the estimated
coefficient capturing the effects of rent-seeking activities on growth, it is crucial to
control other growth determinants.
The rent-seeking activities tend to decrease economic growth through the
misallocation of resources, and reduction in the efficiency and transparency of
public administration(see Auriol et al., 2016). Therefore, poor institutional quality
creates an opportunity for rent-seekers to find their own special interest and
redirects resources—wealth is redistributed by violating regulations. However,
in the context of LICs especially, rent-seeking activities are heterogeneous (Iqbal
and Daly, 2014) as institutional quality differs by countries. For example, the rule
of law is not equally effective, property rights are not equally well defined and
democratic rights are not equally extensive, and these elements differ across LICs.
Following that, there is still a debate on whether rent-seeking activities are ‘sand
or oil to machine’ and hence the existing literature regarding the hypothesis is still
inconclusive.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Dynamic Panel GMM Estimation
To include lagged dependent variables in our empirical models indicates that there
is a correlation between independent variables and the error term since the lagged
dependent variables (i.e. first lags of economic growth, lagged dependent income
, which is a function of the
inequality, and public expenditure) depend on
(i.e. lag of country specific effect). Due to this correlation, Eq. (6) will suffer
from the dynamic panel bias. In other words, under the fixed effects estimator, the
country-specific effect error term would be wiped out within the transformation.
However,
, the correction between the transformed error term and
the transformed lagged dependent variable is a function of 1/T, indicating that
when T is large the correlation would only be negligible. Otherwise, the standard
fixed effects estimator would be biased downwards. Therefore, by employing
the system GMM estimator introduced by Arellano-Bond (1991), we basically
differences the model to remove any time-invariant country-specific effects. The
system GMM estimator treats all regressors are stationary by differencing them,
and thus it eliminates the problem of endogeneity caused by the correlation of
the country-specific effect and the independent variables. This study examined
19 LICs (N) and period cover from 2004 to 2017 (T), fulfilling the requirement
that N > T for correct application of the system GMM estimator. There should
be no concern regarding the small number of time series observations, because
the size of the cross-sectional dimension of the panel determines the asymptotic
properties of the system GMM estimator. The one-step and two-step system GMM
are asymptotically normal under this setting. The difference between one-step and
two-step system GMM is that the two-step system GMM estimator provides small
variance asymptotically as compared to the one-step system GMM estimator.
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Besides, using an optimal weighting matrix, the two-step system GMM estimator
outperforms the one-step system GMM estimator because the former generates
lower bias and standard errors compared with the former. Overall, the system
GMM estimator has flexibility and allows lags of the endogenous variables to be
efficiently incorporated in the model. Thus, this allows for many instrumental
variables to be used in the estimations. To avoid potential proliferation of
instruments, we truncate and collapse lags to reduce the instrument count in the
system GMM estimation.
B. Empirical Approach
Our dynamic empirical economic growth model, which includes a lagged
dependent variable, is as follows:

(6)
where subscripts i and t refer to country and year, respectively; RGDPG is the real
GDP per capita growth; RS is rent-seeking; LBF is total labor force; CP is gross
capital formation; and POP is the total population. u is the error term that contains
country- and time-specific fixed effects, uit=μi+εt+vit, where vit is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance.
The prefix “ln” represents the natural logarithm; αi is the country-specific constant
term; and γ,β1,β2,β3 and β4 are the slopes of the respective estimated parameters. In
addition, the lagged dependent variable is incorporated into the model in order to
account for temporal dependence on the previous real GDP per capita growth of
the current, which can justify the gradual changes in economic growth.
Theoretically β1 is expected to carry a negative sign to indicate that higher rentseeking activities tend to impede economic growth. Rent-seeking is a sign of deep
institutional weakness, and causes a lower rate of investment and expenditure (in
education and health), widening income inequality, decreasing foreign investors’
confidence, and increasing social cost, thereby retarding economic growth.
Based on the mainstream rent-seeking theory literature, rent-seeking has
adverse effects on the public welfare (Gyimah-Brempong, 2002). On the one hand,
this is because part of the resource rent-seeking agents is not directed to goods and
output growth. On the other hand, it is distracted by the institutional conditions
created for reallocation of already created value in the interest of the respective
lobbying agents. This, in turn, indicates a societal loss in two forms, namely the
loss of production volume due to wastage of resources to obtain rents, and the loss
due to inefficient handling/issuing of property rights. These costs often outweigh
the amount of possible rent obtained. What is more interesting is that there might
be competition among economic agents for a monopoly position in the industry.
In the process of competition, losers expend resources rather than invest in the
production of goods. The expended resources or funds are, in turn, redistributed
to the competition’s winners, and ultimately providing no welfare or benefit to the
society as a whole(Tullock, 1967).
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/5
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The redistribution activity that deplete resources, i.e. rent-seeking activity, is so
costly to growth for two reasons. Firstly, rent-seeking activities exhibit very natural
increasing returns. In other words, an ascent of rent-seeking activities leads these
activities to be more attractive, compared to productive activities, and ultimately
results in multiple equilibria in the economy, with “bad” equilibrium exhibiting
substantially high levels of rent-seeking, but low level of output. Particularly,
there are three mechanisms through which the increasing returns in rent-seeking
influence economic growth. One of them is the fixed set-up cost of rent-seeking
system like a legal code. Once set up, lawyers can sue each other’s clients cheaply
and easily, which they could not do so otherwise. Besides, rent-seeking would be
self-fulfilling because offence paves ways for a demand for defence. For example,
if a customer hires lawyer, his supplier will do likewise, thereby leading to a form
of increasing returns. The last mechanism is the “strength in numbers” possessed
by the rent-seekers. If only a few people were involved in burglary, they would
tend to be caught. However, if many of them steal, the chance of being caught is
much lower, and, therefore, the returns to looting are higher. All these mechanisms
that depend on increasing returns to the aggregate rent-seeking technology could
reach multiple equilibria, some of which have an extremely high level of rentseeking and a low level of income.
Secondly, rent-seeking activities, especially by public officers, tend to impede
innovation more than the private rent-seeker. Since innovation serves as one of the
key engines of growth, public rent-seeking, as compared to production, retards
growth in a more extreme manner. In particular, innovators need governmentsupplied goods like import quotas, licenses, permits, and others alike much more
than incumbent producers. Based on the discussed theoretical foundation, the
rent-seeking activities hypothesis—high rent-seeking activities reduce economic
growth—is developed and therefore, β1 is expected to be negative.
Other than the main explanatory variable (rent-seeking), it is also important
to theoretically analyze the linkage between the control variables, namely labor/
human capital, physical capital, and population, and economic growth. While γ,
β2, and β3 are expected to be positive, β4 is expected to carry a negative sign. We
also estimate Eq. (6) using the systemin GMM estimator. To ensure the consistency
of the system GMM estimates, we performed two types of specification test,
namely Sargan’s over-identifying restriction test and the serial correlation test of
the disturbance (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Failure to reject the null hypothesis of
the Sargan test would imply that the instruments are valid and hence the model
is correctly specified. In the serial correlation test, on the other hand, a rejection
of the null hypothesis under the AR(1) and AR(2) tests imply absence of first and
second order serial correlation.
IV. DATA
We use CPI as the proxy for rent-seeking. According to Iqbal and Daly (2014), rentseeking is considered as any activity in which public power is exercised for private
gain including the misuse of public resources. The rent-seeking dataset is obtained
from World Governance Indicators (WGI) and Transparency International (TI).
The sample period of the dataset spans from 2004 to 2017.
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2021
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The descriptive statistics of the variables (in logarithms) are summarized in
Table 2. Economic growth, which is the dependent variable, is proxied by real
GDP per capita growth and is measured in constant 2010 USD (obtained from
World Development Indicators (WDI) database compiled by the World Bank).
The highest value of economic growth per capita is 4.435%, while the lowest
value is -0.261%. Other than that, the variability of economic growth per capita
is 0.285%, while the average value is 3.236%. Rent-seeking activities, proxied by
the CPI indices (obtained from WGI and TI), are scaled from 1 to 6 and from 1 to
100, respectively; higher value implies better control of corruption. For the sake of
consistency, the data for the two rent-seeking activities proxies (namely the WGI
and TI) has been standardized from 1 to 10. The highest value for rent-seeking
activities (measured by WGI) is 4.324, while the lowest value is 0.352; similarly, the
average value is 3.001 and the variability is 0.839. For rent-seeking proxied by the
TI, the highest value is 4.007, while the lowest value is 2.640; similarly, the average
value of the data is equal to 3.270, while the variability is 0.235. Notably, the data is
rebased in order to show that higher values indicate higher levels of rent-seeking
activities in the LICs.
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics and Source of Data
This table presents descriptive statistics, namely the mean, Standard Deviation (SD), maximum (Max) and minimum
(Min) for the period 2004-2017. The variables, namely real GDP per capita growth, rent-seeking activities, total labor
force, capital, and total population, are in the first column. The countries include Benin, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad,
Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Tanzania, Uganda, The Gambia, Zimbabwe. All variables are in natural logarithm.

Variable

Source

lnRGDPG

WDI

lnRS
lnLBF

lnCP
lnPOP

WGI
TI
International
Financial
Statistics
United
Nation
Statistics
Division
WDI

Unit of
measurement

Mean

SD

Min

Max

3.236

0.285

-0.261

4.435

3.001
3.270

0.839
0.235

0.352
2.640

4.324
4.007

Total labor force

0.027

0.011

-0.026

0.042

Gross capital
formation (% of
GDP)

0.131

0.272

-1.115

1.503

Total population

16.421

0.873

14.151

18.469

Constant
2010US$
Index (1-6)
Index (1-100)

In addition, the labor force is proxied by total labor force, which is measured in
thousands (obtained from the International Financial Statistics). Its highest value
is 0.042, while its lowest value is -0.026; the average value for this variable is 0.027,
while the variability is equal to 0.011. Capital formation is represented by capital
investment/capital accumulation, measured in percentage of GDP (obtained from
the United Nation’s Statistic Division). Its highest value is 1.503%, while its lowest
value is -1.115%; the variability is 0.272%, while the average value is 0.131%. Lastly,
population is proxied by total population, measured in thousands (obtained from
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol24/iss2/5
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WDI, World Bank). Its highest value is 18.469, while its lowest value is equal to
14.151, with a variability of 0.873 and an average of 16.421.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 3 presents the empirical results of the dynamic panel Equation (6) using the
system GMM estimator. In particular, the rent-seeking indicator being employed
in the estimations in Models 1a, 1b, and 1c is the CPI obtained from WGI, whereas
Models 2a, 2b, and 2c depict the robustness checks for the above-mentioned
models—capturing rent-seeking by using corruption perception index obtained
from TI. In addition, Models 1a, 1b, and 1c use the one-step system GMM, twostep system GMM, and two-step system GMM with robust standard errors,
respectively. Models 2a, 2b, and 2c are the robustness checks equivalent of Models
1a, 1b, and 1c and thus use the same system GMM estimators.
The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant, which implies that
the dynamic system GMM estimator is an appropriate estimator and that the
empirical results can be relied upon for statistical inference. The results indicate
that rent-seeking activities negatively affect economic growth in the LICs, when
rent-seeking is measured by both CPI indices (i.e. WGI and TI). The negative sign
of the corruption index’s coefficient in Model 1c (WGI) suggests the existence of
an inverse relationship between rent-seeking and economic growth—rent-seeking
plays a role in decreasing economic growth over time. Specifically, a percentage rise
in rent-seeking activities is associated with a 0.15 per cent fall in economic growth.
This result is in line with the findings of Paul (2010). It is also consistent with
the missiles seek heat hypothesis (Aidt, 2016), the invertibility hypothesis (Aidt, 2016),
and Galtung’s (1971) structural theory of imperialism. Based on Aidt’s (2016)
missiles seek heat hypothesis of rent-seeking, the occurrence of contestable rents
produces socially costly activities to target at winning the rents. Rent-seeking
activities also involve social cost (a social problem in the economy) as they will
lead to policy distortions due to the inequitable and unfair allocation of public
resources and funds. Other rent-seeking theory also hypothesize that rent-seeking
activities tend to decrease investment. In short, our main finding that rent-seeking
activities impede economic growth in LICs is in line with various studies. World
Bank defines rent-seeking activity as one of the most demonised’ variables that
tend to retard economic growth and social development by increasing cost of
business and creating indecisions by decreasing competency of infrastructure and
public investment and by lowering productivity of a country.
Furthermore, the positive coefficient of capital accumulation (as shown in
Model 1c) indicates its positive relationship with economic growth. This suggests
that, in order to promote economic growth for LICs, capital accumulation should
be a key focus of policymakers. In particular, a percentage increase in capital
accumulation is associated with a 0.412 per cent increase in economic growth. This
result further supports the idea of Solow’s (1956) growth model, which indicates
that capital accumulation is a significant contributor to the level of production.
Capital accumulation is also a main source of growth in endogenous growth
theory to accelerate the economic development. The result is also consistent with
the findings of Bal et al. (2016).
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The estimated models are well specified as they pass all the three diagnostics
checks. Specifically, the Sargan and Hansen test does not reject the overidentification restriction null hypothesis. Similarly, the AR(1) test result shows a
rejection of the null hypothesis of the absence of first-order serial correlation, but
the AR(2) test result shows no rejection of the null hypothesis of second-order
serial correlation.
The results obtained using the alternative measure of corruption perception
(or rent-seeking) from TI are shown in Models 2a, 2b, and 2c. These results allow
us to examine the validity or robustness of our main results. Based on Model
2c, a percentage increase in rent-seeking activities will reduce economic growth
by 0.184 per cent. The result shows consistency with the baseline result in both
coefficient’s sign and magnitude, reinforcing that rent-seeking activities hamper
economic growth in LICs.
Table 3.
System GMM Results with Robustness Checks
This table shows the estimates obtained using the system GMM estimator to estimate our dynamic panel regressions.
Values in parentheses are t-statistics, except for Sargan and Hansen test for serial correlation, which are p-values. *, **,
and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively.

Variable

lnRGDPGit-1
lnRS(WGI)
lnRS(TI)
lnLBF
lnCP
lnPOP
Cons
Number of
Obs
Number of
groups
Number of
instruments

Model

Model

1a
one-step
system
GMM

1b
two-step
system
GMM

0.206***
(2.90)
-0.00645
(-0.24)
0.0192
(0.88)
0.534***
(3.93)
1.634
(0.52)
2.160***
(5.38)

0.314***
(5.28)
-0.150***
(-2.59)
0.131
(1.53)
0.412***
(3.99)
3.900
(0.53)
-0.155
(-0.09)

247

Model
1c
two-step
system
GMM with
robust
standard
errors (SE)

Model

Model

2a
one-step
system
GMM

2b
two-step
system
GMM

0.314***
(2.71)
-0.150**
(-1.99)
0.131
(1.34)
0.412*
(1.80)
3.900
(0.41)
-0.155
(-0.07)

0.179**
(2.07)
-0.0717
(-0.63)
0.0211
(0.88)
0.445**
(2.38)
1.269
(0.37)
2.029***
(3.91)

0.332***
(4.49)
-0.184**
(-2.21)
-0.0423
(-0.58)
0.446***
(3.79)
-4.851
(-0.98)
2.336
(1.85)

0.332*
(1.91)
-0.184**
(-2.08)
-0.0423
(-0.35)
0.446*
(1.81)
-4.851
(-0.56)
2.336
(1.00)

247

247

220

220

220

19

19

19

19

19

19

86

86

86

50

50

50
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2c
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Table 3.
System GMM Results with Robustness Checks (Continued)

Variable

AR1
AR2
Sargan
Hansen

Model

Model

1a
one-step
system
GMM

1b
two-step
system
GMM

-5.978***
-1.150
84.68

-1.719*
-0.419
84.68
11.30

Model
1c
two-step
system
GMM with
robust
standard
errors (SE)
-1.674*
-0.369
84.68
11.30

Model

Model

2a
one-step
system
GMM

2b
two-step
system
GMM

-4.523***
-0.818
39.31

-1.907*
-0.277
39.31
10.28

Model
2c
two-step
system
GMM with
robust
standard
errors (SE)
-1.777*
-0.237
39.31
10.28

We also performed the cross-sectional dependence test developed by Pesaran
(2004) to check cross-sectional dependency issues in the models for the two
different proxies of corruption perception index. Table 4 reports the results and it
shows that the cross-sectional dependence test failed to reject the null hypothesis
of cross-sectional independence and, therefore, we conclude that cross-sectional
dependency issues do not drive our results.
Table 4.
Cross-sectional Dependence Test
The table shows the cross-sectional dependence test results. Values in parentheses represent p-values.

Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional
independence

Model 1c

Model 2c

1.042(0.298)

-0.051(0.959)

VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION
The problem of rent-seeking is widespread and has caught the attention of various
policymakers and researchers. A widely raised question is whether rent-seeking
negatively influences growth. This study uses the system GMM estimator to
estimate dynamic panel regressions of economic growth on rent-seeking in lowincome countries over the period 2004-2017.
We find that rent-seeking has a negative and significant impact on economic
growth in low-income countries. This finding supports the conventional view
that rent-seeking is an impediment to economic growth, implying that efforts
to maintain and uphold institutional quality, especially in low-income countries
are crucial in promoting the status of low-income countries to middle-income
countries. As such, low-income countries are advised to effectively and efficiently
curb rent-seeking activities by actively adopting anti-rent seeking policies like anticorruption and anti-bribery policies to tackle individuals, who tend to participate
in rent-seeking activities, such as giving or receiving bribery payment from third
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parties. Besides, enforcing rules and regulation is crucial in promoting strong
institutional quality by strengthening or streamlining bureaucracy/process of red
tape, thus reducing rent-seeking opportunities for rent-seekers to engage in this
process and obtain special interests/benefits. Through the right transformation
of the institutional framework of low-income countries, rapid and sustainable
economic growth can be achieved.
Nevertheless, recognition of the ill-effects of rent-seeking may not be sufficient
to reverse them. For instance, a decrease in corruption level is only growthpromoting if supported by well-structured institutions. This paradigm of selfinterest motivated revolutionary activities and, thus, the ambiguity, opens up the
room for further innovative and more constructive research on it. Besides, future
researchers are recommended to employ the bias corrected least square dummy
variable estimator, which can cater for small sample sizes and small time periods
when investigating the impact of rent-seeking on economic growth.
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